The state attorney general’s office has released the second phase of a highly anticipated report on last year’s devastating Aug. 8 Maui wildfires.
Experts from the UL's Fire Safety Research Institute assisted in developing the analysis, which contains information about the state and county’s response to the disaster and provides recommendations to mitigate failings in future wildfire events.
The report describes a series of policy mishaps regarding vegetation management, congested roadways, a lack of planning from key agencies, and communication breakdowns between stakeholders.
It does not, however, determine the cause of the Lahaina fire. The state attorney general's office has left that responsibility to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
According to the Phase 2 report, the ATF investigation continues and has not determined a release date.
Read the full report below, or click here to open a new window.
Key takeaways
A running theme throughout the Phase 2 report is the lack of planning for wildfire events and a broad underestimation of wildfire risks.
Vegetation played a crucial role in the Lahaina wildfires.
“There were limited-to-no active wildland vegetative fuels management efforts in the vicinity of Lahaina’s urban areas before Aug. 8, 2023, leaving the majority of vegetation to grow unimpeded and dense due to steady build-up over long time scales,” the report stated.
For example, one parcel of impacted area was managed by the state Department of Land and Natural Resources — and had no record of any vegetation management.
Subdivisions in the area had “very little if any” defensible space — a buffer cleared of flammable debris — between structures. That was with a few exceptions, such as a newer development built about five years ago and Launiupoko, which was working on vegetation reduction with the Firewise USA program.
Large private lands that were once used for farming went unused, unmanaged and fallow.
Communication efforts
Another issue highlighted in the report was the breakdown in communication between Maui Police Department, Maui Emergency Management Agency, Maui Fire Department, Hawaiian Electric Company and the Hawaiʻi Emergency Management Agency.
“The Incident Command Systems were ill-prepared to scale up in response to the increasing demands of the wildfire incident,” the report explained.
“This lack of readiness and coordination left responders struggling with the dynamic and rapidly escalating conditions of the Lahaina P.M. fire, highlighting critical gaps in both preparedness and response coordination across the agencies involved.”
The report recommended that plans be developed between departments for wildfire response and that officials update processes for information sharing between local and state emergency management agencies.
It also suggested that MEMA better define roles and responsibilities for staff members and that HECO be included and present at the incident command post.
Communication with the public was also scrutinized in the report. About 87% of people said they did not receive a text notification from the county about the high winds.
Out of five emergency sirens located along the coastline of the Lahaina fire, only two were operable at the time.
Moving forward
The Phase 2 report suggests native ecosystem restoration and active agricultural use for long-term risk reduction. It recommends that policymakers increase funding for vegetative management and consider penalizing agricultural landowners who do not actively use their land or practice proper management.
In terms of evacuation, the report addressed how town parking should be corrected to avoid narrow streets where cars are parked on both sides. During the fire, debris made many roads impassable, and old sugar cane roads became crucial alternative evacuation routes.
MPD did not include a plan for evacuation in Lahaina. The report states that at 6:15 p.m. all officers not engaged in traffic posts were recalled to the station to address lack of coordination and accountability.
